S oftware security and software safety share the need to assure that software will remain dependable under extraordinary conditions. Extraordinary conditionsthose which software was not intended to gracefully tolerate-will either cause it to behave unpredictably or fail outright. What distinguishes software safety from software security is what constitutes an extraordinary condition for that software, and what is at stake if it fails as a result.
Extraordinary conditions that threaten software safety are termed hazards, reflecting the perception that such conditions are accidental. By contrast, extraordinary conditions that threaten software security are termed attacks or exploits, indicating their intentionality. The objective of most attacks on software is to sabotage or subvert the software's operation by exploiting one or more weaknesses in the software's execution environment (e.g., failure of the application firewall that blocks malicious input from entering the system), design (e.g., accepting input from unrecognized entities), implementation (e.g., accepting input in a fixed-length buffer without first validating that input's length), operation (e.g., a failure of user interface software, thereby exposing the system's command line), or development process (e.g., poor configuration control, peer review, and testing practices that allow a disgruntled programmer to surreptitiously embed malicious logic).
Intentional Threats to Safety-Critical Systems
Software failures that result from safety hazards can have dire, even fatal, consequences due to the extremely strong linkage between the software and the physical system that it is supposed to control. Whether the software constitutes the single small, closely contained embedded program that controls an automobile's anti-lock braking system, or several dozen modules dispersed throughout a distributed supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system controlling an entire region's wastewater treatment, the functions performed by the physical components are what determine whether the system (including its software) is safetycritical. If a system failure results in damage to the physical environment in which people live, physical maiming, damage to health, or death of one or more humans, the system is safety-critical. The failure of software in such a system can have catastrophic results.
Safety hazards tend to be straightforward and accidental. By contrast, security threats are intentional: the result of human creativity and perspicacity absent from safety hazards (although a hazard may introduce a vulnerability that an attacker can intentionally exploit). Because they are guided by human intelligence, security threats are usually less predictable, more complex, more numerous, and more persistent than safety hazards. The same system may be repeatedly targeted by a variety of simultaneous and sequential attacks, some aimed at the interface level, others at the application components, and still others at the execution environment level-all orchestrated to accumulate and intensify until they collectively produce the critical failure(s), enabling the attacker to achieve his objective.
Google "Ariane 5 Flight 501," "Therac-25 accidents," or "Toyota Prius software bug" to read about some dramatic instances of safety-critical systems that failed as a result of design flaws or implementation errors in their software. These were unintentional flaws and errors, caused by developer inadvertence, negligence, or misapprehension, but their impact was dramatic. How much more disastrous might they have been had their cause been intentional exploitation or implanted malicious logic?
Now Google "trans-Siberian gas pipeline" + "software bug." What you'll get are reports of the 1982 technology coup. The CIA, having learned that Soviet spies planned to secretly acquire a gas pipeline controller developed in Canada, planted a Trojan horse (logic bomb) in the controller's software. Once installed on the trans-Siberian pipeline, the controller ran a test of the pipeline's pressure gauges during which the logic bomb reset those gauges to double gas pressure in the pipeline. The resulting explosion was, up to that time, the largest non-nuclear explosion ever photographed from space [1] .
In the 25-plus years since that incident, attacks on safety-critical systems involving the embedding of malicious code or direct penetrations have proliferated, several of which have been perpetrated by the systems' own disgruntled developers or administrators. Such attacks are proliferating due in part to opportunity: More safety-critical systems are built from or hosted on commodity software, the vulnerabilities of which are widely publicized and well understood by attackers, then exposed on semi-or fully open networks (including the Internet). The increasing software intensiveness of safety-critical systems means more of their critical functions are performed by software than by hardware, and that software is necessarily larger and more complex, making its vulnerabilities harder to predict and detect.
As with safety hazards, the impact of software failures resulting from attacks and exploits depends on the nature of the targeted system. A threat to a safety-critical system can have the same dire consequences as a hazard. Even in non-safetycritical systems, the consequences of failure can be catastrophic: Insider sabotage of an intelligence database application may enable an attacker to steal the names of undercover operatives in an adversarial country and sell it to that country's 
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September/October 2009 counterintelligence service, which then has them captured and executed. The subversion of software in a military logistics system that calculates the number of biochemical suits may result in a shortage of protection for forward-deployed forces during a chemical weapons attack.
Embedded, Not Isolated
Many safety-critical systems are embedded. Until recently, that meant they were small, relatively simple, and isolated from direct interaction with humans (they even lacked means for such interaction). Today's embedded systems are different. They both benefit and become vulnerable from the increased power of the processors on which they are hosted. These are processors that enable the use of commodity operating systems, such as Microsoft CE, which share security problems with non-embedded operating systems sharing the same kernel code 1 . The less proprietary and more connected embedded systems become, the less specialized expertise attackers need to target them. Systems from temperature controls to medical devices to on-board automobile computers and sensors are now accessible via wireless Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), cellular, and satellite links that use standard communications protocols. Implanted medical devices are increasingly accessible via RFID [2] . A DoD telemedicine application enables surgeons in U.S. military hospitals to issue commands, via a satellite uplink, to a software-controlled robot in Iraq, thereby performing laser surgery on wounded soldiers in theater [3, 4] .
But where there is a wireless network, one can almost guarantee there will be an attacker attempting to locate, intercept, and tamper with the signals transmitted between the systems at either end of the wireless link. Consider telematic systems such as GM's OnStar, Ford's remote emergency satellite cellular unit and vehicle emergency messaging system, Volvo's On Call, BMW's Assist, and MercedesBenz's Tele Aid and COMAND. They all use cellular or satellite connections to allow their call center representatives to perform remote diagnostics on the onboard computers of subscribers' vehicles. Privacy concerns about certain data collected by these telematic services are well documented, but a recent addition to OnStar is even more worrying. Owners of 1.7 million OnStar-equipped 2009 GM vehicles can allow their engines to be "remotely switched off through the OnStar mobile communications system" [5] at the behest of the police. The goal is to stop stolen GM vehicles in their tracks during high-speed police car chases, thereby reducing the number of fatal accidents associated with such chases. The implications of OnStar's transition from a passive monitoring and diagnostics system to an active controller of a safety-critical embedded system (the engine) have been noted:
[Some] automotive communication networks have access to crucial components of the vehicle, like brakes, airbags, and the engine control. Cars that are equipped with driving aid systems allow deep interventions in the driving behavior of the vehicle .... Malicious attackers are not to be underestimated. [6] The next logical step-remote updates via telematic links to embedded software and firmware-would create an ideal conduit for insertion of malicious logic into embedded computers or causing denialof-service by injecting "garbage bits" into telematic data streams [7] .
Security of Safety-Critical Infrastructure
Along with embedded systems, another type of safety-critical system never originally intended to support publicly discoverable/accessible wireless network connections is the industrial control system. Both the SCADA and distributed control systems (DCSs), along with air traffic control systems, are safety-critical hybrids of information systems, command and control systems, and physical process control systems. They support the same open networking protocols, remote accessibility, and even Internet connectivity typically found in information and command and control systems. Like those systems, safety-critical control systems are being built from commodity and open components and hosted on mobile devices running commodity and open operating systems.
A sobering example of where such advances can lead occurred in the Maroochy wastewater treatment facility in Queensland, Australia [8, 9] . The DCS that controlled the facility included remote administration software that ran on Microsoft Windows and provided remote wireless network access to the facility's physical control functions (including opening and shutting valves). Vitek Boden, a former contractor who helped install the system, later submitted a job application that was rejected. The vengeful engineer
had a wireless radio transmitter, used a stolen copy of the DCS's remote administration software to identify himself to the DCS as "Pumping Station 4," then issued commands that suppressed the DCS's alarms and changed its settings to place excessive back-pressure on the valves.
By the time the plant's operators finally figured out that the series of inexplicable failures in the plant were caused by sabotage of its DCS and notified police, Boden was in the midst of his 46th incursion into the system. In the end, he managed to release between 264,000 and 1.18 million gallons of raw sewage (including human waste): The Maroochy River tributaries turned black, marine life was poisoned, and the air reeked.
Not only does the Maroochy incident vividly illustrate the danger of the insider threat, it shows how vulnerable remotecontrolled safety-critical systems can be 2 .
As the Washington Post observed:
… like thousands of utilities around the world, Maroochy Shire allowed technicians operating remotely to manipulate its digital controls. Boden learned how to use those controls as an insider, but the software he used conforms to international standards, and the manuals are available on the Web. Nearly identical systems run oil and gas utilities and many manufacturing plants. [7] Secure Development of Safety-Critical Software Software engineering for safety-critical systems is impressively scientific and disciplined. It is driven by heightened quality and fault-tolerance imperatives and has careful, thorough hazard analyses, faulttolerant designs, and rigorous testing. As well, safe subsets of programming languages are used and formal specification, modeling, and verification is utilized. As a result, most safety-critical systems can tolerate and continue operating dependably in the presence of the unintentional faults and failures associated with safety hazards.
But safety-critical software must be equally intolerant of failures caused by intentional threats and keep operating dependably even under attack. This means eliminating weaknesses, bugs, flaws, errors, etc., that don't necessarily lead to failures, but which can be exploited by attackers.
Security for safety-critical systemsand indeed for all software-based systems-must be achieved at the functional, data, and environmental levels. At the functional level, the software must be able to withstand threats to its own integrity and availability; these include threats of denial-of-service, intentional corruption or tampering with the software's executables and/or control files, and embedding/insertion of malicious logic. At the data level, inputs received and outputs produced by the software may be tampered with or intentionally corrupted. If the system stores, manipulates, or transmits information, that information is also subject to the same threats, plus the threat of inappropriate disclosure. The software's execution environment is subject to threats to its availability and integrity, along with a further threat of hijacking or theft of computing resources (memory, disk space, computing power) by illicit processes that make those resources unavailable to valid processes.
Software security focuses on specifying software's internal workings to remain dependable in the presence of potentially hostile external interactions. Moreover, the software must not contain design weaknesses or implementation errors that, if intentionally or accidentally escalated, could lead to a failure (i.e., any incorrect or unpredictable behavior) that could leave the software exposed and vulnerable to direct attack. Such failures may result from a hostile input to the software itself, or from a fault triggered by an attack on the software's environment.
Secure = Survivable
To date, the established paradigm for system security has combined proactive PDR strategies (which includes recovery). Protection is often achieved through defense-in-depth layering of security mechanisms, controls, and procedures at the functional, data, and environmental levels of the system. Detection of threats (or more accurately, their manifestation as intrusions and attacks) is achieved by a combination of intrusion detection, event logging, and usage auditing and monitoring. Reaction to intrusions and attacks focuses on minimizing the extent, intensity, and duration of the incidents' impact and the likelihood of their recurrence. Reaction often comes at the expense of dependability because it requires rejecting certain types of inputs (some of which may in fact be valid), terminating some user sessions, shutting down some or all functions, or disconnecting the system from the network (to disengage it from the suspected attack source).
In the DoD, practitioners of information assurance, computer network defense, and cybersecurity have begun to admit that this PDR paradigm is essentially flawed. Attackers have become too skilled, too expert, too flexible, and too ingenious for countermeasures that rely on the ability to recognize the threat to keep up. Information and cyber warfare fought on current terms is not just being lost, it is unwinnable.
The DoD and numerous other organizations now recognize the need for a paradigm shift to enable their systems to survive high-intensity intrusions and attacks. Survivability (also referred to as resilience), which has always been required for safety-critical systems, must become the norm for mission-and security-critical software as well.
Designing for survivability means including redundancy and rapid recovery features at the system level (e.g., automated backups and hot-sparing with automatic swap-over of high-consequence components and modularized designs that enable those components to be decoupled and replicated on hot spare platforms). It means implementing significantly more error and exception-handling functionality than program functionality: error and exception handling that is purpose-built, not generic, to minimize the possibility of faults escalating into failures. If possible, rather than failing, the software should be able to keep running at a degraded level of operation (i.e., reduced performance, termination of lower-priority functions, rejection of new inputs/connections). If it must fail, its exception handler should prevent the failure from placing the software into an insecure state, dumping core memory, or exposing the content of its caches, temporary files, and other transient data stores. For safety-critical software-in which there is no threshold of tolerance for the delays typically involved in post-failure recovery and restoration-survivability measures must prevent failures, full stop. This is true whether the failure was accidental or intentionally induced. Resilient Software inia.edu/research/willow>), and Mithril, developed by the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (see <http://security.ncsa.uiuc.edu/research/ mithril/>). These efforts combine techniques for engineering high-confidence and safety-critical software with software security assurance principles and practices, and generate methodologies and tools for producing software that can remain survivable in the face of intentional threats as well as accidental hazards.
Engineering for Survivability
Emerging survivability techniques, as well as more established high-confidence and safety engineering techniques, methods, and tools can benefit developers of software-based systems with strong security imperatives, including systems that are larger, more complex, more interactive, and more extensively networked than most safety-critical systems, high-confidence embedded systems, cryptosystems, and so forth.
Software Practices that Aid Security and Safety
Just as developers of security-critical software can benefit from safety engineering practices, safety-critical software development needs to undergo its own paradigm shift to account for intentional hazards.
Researchers in both the safety and security communities are adopting and adapting software assurance principles, practices, and tools from the other community to aid them in producing software that is safe and secure. Among these efforts, three significant trends stand out:
Simplification of Formal Methods
Tool-supported modeling and proofs of security properties in large, complex software systems is made possible by semi-formal methods, such as: 1) Praxis High Integrity Systems' Correctness-by-Construction, which is a structured development methodology into which formalisms have been selectively incorporated; and 2) tools that automate formal activities so they can be performed by non-experts. Examples include Correctness-by-Construction's supporting tools, Munich University of Technology's Autofocus and Quest, Jean-Raymond Abrial's B-Method, and (to some extent) the Object Management Group's Model-Driven Architecture.
Hybrid Assurance Cases
Hybrid assurance case standards, templates, and processes (including both safety and security arguments and evidence) are emerging. Examples include the SafSec standard developed by Praxis High Integrity Systems for the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense and ISO/IEC 15026, System and Software Engineering-System and Software Assurance. Also noteworthy are the safety and security extensions defined for the integrated CMM ® and CMMI ® by the Federal Aviation Administration and the DoD [10] . Their objective: extend processes defined by and validated under those CMMs to include safety and security engineering practices.
Biological Models and Computer Immunology
Biological models and computer immunology are being applied to software resilience/survivability to achieve diversity and evolution/adaptation through: 1) creation of different instantiations of software programs whereby the computational results are identical but the architectures, source code, and/or binary images diverge and thus are not all equally susceptible to the same threats and 2) use of pseudo-genetic algorithms to gradually evolve executables over time within the acceptable bounds of the software's functional specifications, thus enabling them to continue operating correctly despite the transformation. Specific techniques include: dynamic software composition, N-version programming, and code filtering. Other biological metaphors have resulted in software rejuvenation, phylogenetic trees for predicting vulnerabilities, and techniques for nature-based modeling of software systems.
Conclusion
Survivability as an adjunct to the PDR model of information assurance and cybersecurity is expected to be embraced more fully by DoD and by other communities that operate mission-critical, safetycritical, and life-critical systems. To the extent that software safety engineering minimizes or eliminates implementation errors and environment faults, it contributes to the security of that software. It cannot, however, achieve security on its own because it does not consider design weaknesses that can be exploited as vulnerabilities or exploitable errors and faults that are not expected to result in failures. Adding software security principles and practices to software safety engineering can bridge the gap between producing software that remains dependable in the presence of unintentional hazards and software that remains dependable in the ® CMM and CMMI are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office by Carnegie Mellon University.
